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The positive association between long-term interest rates and M1
"surprises" typically is ascribed to changes in inflation expectations
inducedby the unanticipatedmoney supply changes. The empirical tests
in this paper use a. term structure framework for explaining long-term
interest rates to isolate more carefully this effect. One ofthe surprising
results is that the expectations effectdoes notshow up in the pre-October
1979 data, the period in which it is generally assumed that the Fed's
proceduresfor controlling money were less well designed to fight infla-
tion. Anhypothesis thatthe presenceoflarge governmentbudgetdeficits
in the post-1979 period may account for the presence ofa significant
expectations effectthen does notappear to be borne outby the data.
In recent years, many financial and monetary
economists have offeredexplanations for the strong
responses ofinterestrates and exchange rates to the
Federal Reserve's weekly Ml-announcements; For
example, when an announced increase in MI is
larger than expected by the market (or adecrease is
smallerthan expected), short- and long-term interest
rates generally increase on the following day, and
the dollar appreciates in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. Theopposite movements generally are observed
when MI comes in below market expectations.
This phenomenon probably arises because the
market perceives that the Fed attempts to exercise
control over MI, but that it does so somewhat cau-
tiously. That is, in the short-run, the Fed is per-
ceived as attempting to offset some, but not all, of
the deviations ofMl from target. The responses of
short-term interest rates and exchange rates there-
fore probably reflect a policy anticipations effect:
when Ml increases more than anticipated, the mar-
ket expects the Fed to tighten monetary policy tem-
porarily, which will raise real short-term interest
rates and exchange rates. Responses of long-term
rates have been interpreted primarily as reflecting
changes in inflation expectations: the market ex-
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pects the Fed to react against a money surprise, but
not to react strongly enough to prevent some in-
crease in inflation in the future. This phenomenon is
called the expectedinflation effect.
Given these effects, it is nevertheless puzzling
that long-term bond rates have responded as sharply
as they have in the past five years to money supply
announcements, and that they have responded more
sharply since October 1979 than before. Since the
Fed changed its operating procedures in October
1979 to enhance control over M1to attain better the
objective of gradually bringing inflation down, it
would make more sense if bond rates responded
more sharply to Ml-surprises in the earlier period
than in the later one. In this paper, we attempt to
solve this puzzle in two separate ways. First, instead
ofanalyzing the behavior oflong-term bond rates,
as most previous studies have done, we examine
short-term interest rates expected to prevail in the
distant future. For the reasons discussed below,
changes in long-term rates can be difficult to inter-
pret because they reflect changes in short-term real
rates as well as expected inflation. However, the
expected future short-term rates examined in this
study should provide "cleaner" estimates of the
responses to expected inflation, and therefore may
help solve the puzzle described above.
Second, we examine the possibility that the exis-tence of "large" expected future structural budget
deficits in recent years might have affected the size
ofresponses to money supply announcements. The
argument is that when current and future federal
deficits are high, positive Ml-surprises may tend to
intensify fears thatthe Fedmight monetize part of
the government debt associated with the deficits.
Conversely, negative Ml-surprises could reduce
concerns about monetization. Thus, the change in
fiscal policy regimes that occurred in 1981, when
expected future deficits apparently became large,
could have affected the responses ofinterest rates to
MI-surprises.
The tests in this paper support the conclusion that
there is both a policy anticipation effect and an
inflation expectation effect operating simultane-
ously. Their existence confirms the idea that the
market believes the Fed pursues its monetary con-
trol objectives somewhat cautiously. Moreover, the
tests provide some evidence that a stronger policy
anticipations effect is associated with a weaker in-
flation expectation effect. Finally, the results sug-
gest that expected inflation effects are significant
for only about seven years into the future, and that
these effects, together with movements in current
and near-term real interest· rates, accountfor the
observedlarge responses of30-yearbond rates.
The major remaining puzzle is why there was not
a significant expected inflation effect prior to the
Fed's anti-inflation policy that began in October
1979. As noted above, this paper examines the
hypothesis thatthis apparent inconsistency mightbe
related to the change in fiscal policy regimes. in
1981. Itis possiblethatgreaterfears ofmonetization
in the latter period may have caused the inflation
expectations effect to be larger. However, tests of
this hypothesis met with only mixed success, and
this puzzle willhave to be solvedbyfuture research.
Section I reviews the literature on money supply
announcements, and points out the apparently puz-
zling behavioroflong-term interestrates. SectionII
presents empirical estimates of the responses of
short-term spot rates and several forward interest
rates to Ml-surprises in three monetary control re-
gimes: September 1977-0ctober 1979, October
1979-0ctober 1982, and October 1982-February
1984. Section III tests for effects of the change in
fiscal policy regimes in mid-198I. Conclusions are
presented in Section IV.
I. The Money Supply Announcement Puzzle
In recent years, economists have produced a
plethora ofjournal articles on the responses ofvari-
ous financial asset prices to the Federal Reserve's
weekly announcements ofM1. 1 Interest in this sub-
ject became intense following the Federal Reserve's
change in operating procedures in October 1979.
Prior to that date, the Federal Reserve had attempted
to control money over periods of several quarters
through very gradual changes in the Federal funds
rate. 2 Under the new procedures, which used non-
borrowed reserves as the instrument of monetary
control, the Fed permitted short-term interest rates
to vary in the short-run more than they had previ-
ously.3 Greater interest rate volatility was consid-
ered necessary to achieve greater control over the
monetary aggregates in the short-run. Moreover,
for mostofthe period up to the fall of 1982, MI was
given the most weight in monetary policy decisions.
Coincident with the change in Federal Reserve
operating procedures, interest rates and foreign ex-
change rates began to respond strongly to the Fed's
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weekly announcement of the most recent weekly
M1figure. Actually, the reactions were systematic
only when changes in M1differed from the change
expected by the market. Thus, changes in M1anti-
cipated by the market seemed to induce nosystema-
tic response in asset yields, presumably because the
responses previously had been incorporated into
yields.
A large number of studies have estimated the
responses ofyields to unanticipated changes in M1,
both before and afterthe October 1979 change in the
operating procedures ofthe Fed. These studies used
similar econometric techniques in their tests. The
explanatory variable in the regressions was the
"surprise" in the change in weekly Ml-that is,
the change in the actual M1announced by the Fed
minus the change in expected MI. The latter vari-
able is measured as the median value of a set of
forecasts by money market economists surveyed
and recorded by Money Market Services, Inc. This
survey has been conducted from September 1977 tothe present. The dependent variables in previous
studies include changes in a variety of long- and
short-term interest rates and exchange rates, where
the change is measured from the end ofthe day of
theMI announcementto the following day.
Although different studies have used somewhat
different sample periods, they have obtained very
similarresults. Priorto October 1979, the responses
ofshort-term interest rates, long-term interest rates
and dollar exchange rates were very small, and
generally (thoughnot always) statistically insignifi-
cant. Forexample, using data from January 1978 to
October 1979, Cornell (1983) found that, in re-
sponse to a I-percent positive MI-surprise, the
three-month Treasury bill rate rose by (statistically
insignificant) 2 basis points, and the 30-year Trea-
sury bond rate fell by (statistically insignificant) 0.4
basis point. A very small response also was found
for the dollar price of the German mark. From
October 1979-December 1981, the response be-
came highly significant. A I-percent positive M1-
surprise was associated with a (statistically signifi-
cant) 30-basis point increase in the three-month
Treasury bill rate, a 15-basis-point increase in the
30-year Treasury bond rate, and an appreciation of
the exchange rate.
Alternative Theoretical Explanations
A number oftheories would predict responses of
asset yields to MI-surprises. To understand these
channels of influence, it is useful to consider the
Fisher equation (I). This equation states that the
nominal interest rate (i) ofa particular holding peri-
od can be decomposed into the real interest rate (r)
ofthe same holding period and the expected rate of
int1ation over that period (pC). Both the real and
int1ation components ofthe nominal rate depend on
expectations about the future. MI announcements
can cause changes in interest rates by altering those
expectations.
r + pC (I)
A second concept that enters the discussion of
MI-surprises is the expectations theory ofthe term
structure ofinterest rates. This theory maintains that
securities of different maturities are good substi-
tutes, so that competition in the financial markets
will equate the holding period yields ofsecuritiesof
different maturities. Thus, for example, the inves-
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tor can expect to obtain the same yield by (I) hold-
ing a six-month Treasury bill to maturity, or (2)
holding a three-month T-bill to maturity and then
reinvesting the proceeds in a second three-month
bill and holding it to maturity. For this reason, the
yieldOn the six-month bill will be equal to a weight-
ed average ofthe yield on the three-month bill and
the expected yield on the three-month bill, three
months from now. The latter yield is called a for-
ward rate. Changes in these short-term forward
rates cause changes in the same direction in long-
term rates. This term structure theory provides a
link between expected future short-term rates and
long-term rates that plays an important part in the
various explanations advanced for the effects ot'
MI-surprises.
Expected Inflation Effect
The expected inflation theory holds that an Ml-
surprise is taken as new information about the cur-
rent and future growth in the quantity ofMl supplied
by the Federal Reserve. As such, a positive Ml-sur-
prise causes interest rates to rise because it raises
int1ation expectations. This theory has an unambig-
uous implication for long-term rates and for the
exchange rate. Higher expected int1ation should
raise the former and depreciate the latter. The effect
onexchangerates follows from the anticipated drop
in the purchasing powerofthe dollar. The effects on
short-term rates would depend on how quickly the
price level can adjust to a change in money supply
-that is, on how "sticky" prices are in the short-
run. Presumably, ifprices were sufficiently t1exible,
one would observe an increase in short-term rates
following a positive MI-surprise.
The empirical results contradict the expected in-
t1ation hypothesis in two ways. First, the exchange
rate appreciates with a positive Ml-surprise rather
than depreciates, as predicted by theory. Second,
the positive effects of Ml-surprises on long-term
rates grew larger with the change in Fed operating
procedures in 1979. IIMI-surprises changed long-
term rates by altering int1ation expectations, then
the implementation of a new anti-int1ation policy
should have reduced the estimatedresponses. Even
if the change in procedures had no credibility, it
would not have increased them; it would have left
the responses unchanged.Policy Anticipations Effect
The policy anticipations theory4 proposes that
Ml-surprises lead to changes in real interest rates.
When the Fed attempts to control Ml, a positive
Ml-surprise leads the market to anticipate an in-
crea.se in short-term (real) interest rates as the Fed
attempts to bring Ml undercontrol. In otherwords,
the market believes that the change in Ml was
induced by a factor other than anintentional action
ofthe Fed. Since the Fed wants to control Ml, it
subsequently will take actions to do so and its ac-
tions will affect real interest rates. The anticipation
oftheseactionscauses rates tochange immediately.
The maturities of the rates that are affected de-
pend on what the market perceives is the source of
the Ml-surprise. Ifpressures for the change in Ml
are not expected to persist for long, then only very
short-term interest rates should change. It also is
possible, for example, that the market interprets a
positive Ml-surprise as an indication that GNP is
stronger than it originally believed, and that this
growth has raised the quantity ofmoney demanded.
An upward revision in estimated currentGNPcould
lead to expectationsofhigherGNP for several years
to come, and the market might expect the Fed to
offset these pressures through gradual and fairly
prolonged increases in short-termrates. As a conse-
quence, expected forward rates would rise, and
their rise would push up longer term spot interest
rates. However, since the Fed cannotholdreal inter-
est rates above the equilibrium level into the very
distant future, this theory wouldpredict that little, if
any, ofthe effect ofMl-surprises on forward rates
would prevail into the distant future.
Finally, the policy anticipation theory predicts
that a positive Ml-surprise causes the dollar to ap-
preciate. This occurs because money surprises
cause real interest rates to move, and higher real
U.S. interest rates cause the demand for dollar-de-
nominated assets to rise.
This hypothesis is consistent with the responses
of short-term interest rates and exchange rates. It
also is consistent with the result that both of these
variables movedmore afterOctober 1979, whenthe
Fed's monetary control efforts were more aggres-
sive, than before that date, when the Fed tended to
respond more gradually. However, thestrongriseof
long-term interestrates afterOctober 1979 has been
interpreted as contradicting this hypothesis. The
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reasoning goes thatalthough the Fed can drive real
interest rates up by reducing the money supply in
the short-run, the effect on real rates should not be
evident iri the distant future when prices have had
time to adjust. If the period ofmonetary restraint
lasts only a short time, thenonly the current interest
rate .and forward rates covering the near future
should rise; the effect on long-term interest rates
should be small. Ifthe Fed follows a tighter policy
far into the future, the policy should eventually
reduce inflation expectations and lower 10hg-term
interest rates.
Combined Effects
The theories discussed above are not mutually
exclusive. One can reasonably combine the policy
anticipations and expected inflation effects into an
explanation of responses of various asset prices to
MI-surprises. 5 The argument is that, in the post-
October 1979 period, the Fedtried to control Ml but
did so somewhat cautiously. As a result, when the
market observed a larger-than-expected increase in
Ml, it assumed that only part of it would be offset
by a policy response and that part of it would per-
manently raise Ml. Short-term rates consequently
rose because the Fed was expectedto tightenpolicy,
and long-term rates rose at the same time because
part of the Ml increase was expected to remain in
the money stock permanently. Unfortunately, this
combinedtheory cannotbe tested with theexchange
rate after October 1979 because the predictions are
ambiguous, that is, the increase in real rates would
cause the dollar to apprecjate, while the increase in
inflation expectations would cause a depreciation.
This explanation fits the post-October 1979 data
quite well, with both long- and short-term interest
rates rising when Ml came inoverexpectations. For
the pre-October 1979 period, the prediction clearly
would be for (at most) the observed small response
ofthe short-term rate because the Fed reacted very
gradually to the MI numbers. However, the long-
termrate shouldhave respondedpositively, because
the former funds rate operatingprocedureoftheFed
implied that a larger part of an Ml-surprise would
be permanent. Bythesametoken, theexchange rate
should have depreciated when Ml came in over
expectations. These lasttwopredictionsofthe com-
bination theory do not fit the datafor the pre-October
1979 period-neither the long-term rate nor the
exchange rate responded significantly in that periOd.II. Forward Interest Rates
One key aspect ofthe puzzling reaction offinan-
cial asset prices to Ml-surprises is that short- and
long-teon rates seem to respond in the same way.
Thus, prior to October 1979, neitherrate responded
significantly, whereas afterward, they both respon-
ded positively. As discussed above, the two theories
used to explain these responses, as well as the
combination theory, do not necessarily predict that
long- and short-rates will move in the same direc-
tion. The reason is that short-term rates are taken as
a measure ofchanges in real interest rates, whereas
changes in long-term rates are seen primarily to
reflect changes in inflation expectations. The real
and expected inflation components of nominal in-
terest rates should respond in different ways to an
Ml-surprise depending upon the public's percep-
tion of how policy is being conducted. Prior to
October 1979, the Fed may have been perceived as
permitting a significant part of a positive Ml-sur-
prise to remain in the money supply permanently. In
reaction, there should have been only a small re-
sponse by real rates (reflected in the short-term rate)
and a fairly large increase in inflation expectations
(reflected in the long-term rates). After October
1979, short-term rates should have responded
strongly, whereas long-rates might have been ex-
pected to respond only slightly because ofthe Fed's
anti-inflation stance.
The assumption that the responses ofshort-term
rates to MI-surprises reflect the real component of
interest rates is strongly supported by evidence that
prices adjust to changes in the money supply with a
lag. Given this evidence, it is difficult to believe
that today's money "blip" causes any perceptible
change in the inflation expected, say, over the next
three months.
However, the assumption that movements in
long-term rates primarily reflect changes in infla-
tion expectations does not rest on such firm footing.
According to the expectations theory of the term
structure of interest rates, long-term spot rates are
weighted averages of the current short-term spot
rate and the expected short-term forward rates.
Thus, it is possible that long- and short-term rates
move in the same direction because long-term rates,
in part, are made up of short-term rates. In other
words, changes in inflation expectations may not
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always. dominate observed changes in long-term
interestrates. At times, observed changes may sim-
ply reflect movements in short-term spot rates and
fairly Ilear-term forward rates. This observation
suggests that the hypotheses concerning responses
to Ml-surprises should be tested with short-term
spot rates and short-term forward rates expected
to prevail far into the future. Changes in, say,
the expected one-year rate, thirty years forward
should give an indication ofmovements in inflation
expectations.
Unfortunately, it is mathematically difficult to
calculate expected forward rates from the term struc-
ture when one must use bonds that are coupon
instruments. Forward rates have been used in anoth-
er study of Ml-surprises, but the calculations were
simplified by assuming, in effect, that coupon
bonds were discount bonds. 6 This method provides
only very rough estimates offorward rate changes,
and the result that forward rates far into the future
moved in the same direction as long-term spot rates
should be viewed with caution.
The study in this paper uses a method ofcalculat-
ing forward rates from a term structure ofspot rates
on coupon bonds developed by Shiller, Campbell
and Schoenholtz (1983).7 The authors have demon-
strated that their approximation ofthe true formula
forcalculating the desired forward rates yields close
estimates, except in cases of extreme interest rate
volatility.
Empirical Results
In this section, we analyze the impact ofMI-an-
nouncements on the financial markets by regression
methods similar to those that have been commonly
applied in the literature describedabove, exceptthat
we look at the responses ofshort-term forward rates
rather than long-term spot rates. More specifically,
we use weekly Ml-surprises as the variable to ex-
plain changes on the day after the Ml-announce-
ment in three financial variables-the three-month
Treasury bill rate; the two-yearT-bill rate, expected
5-years forward; and the ten-year T-note rate, ex-
pected 20-years forward. Changes in the three-
month rate are taken to reflect changes in the real
component. Changes in the two forward rates are
taken as reflecting changes in expected inflation.These (ordinary least squares) regressions were
run over three sample periods, each corresponding
to a different monetary policy regime. Regime I
stretches from September 21, 1977 to October 3,
1979, and falls in the period when the Fed used the
Federal funds rate as an operating instrument. As
discussed earlier, this is a period when the Fed
attempted monetary control only over periods of
several quarters through gradual movements in the
funds rate. In doing so, it tended to smooth short-
run changes in the funds rate. Regime II covers
October 6, 1979 to October 3, 1982, the period of
the nonborrowed reserves operating procedure in
which the Fed attempted monetary control over
shorter time periods, and in doing so permitted
much more short-run variationin short-terminterest
rates. In Regime III, which covers October 10,
1982 to February 8, 1984, nonborrowed reserves
no longer were linked to Ml as they had been
before. This period can be considered a kind of
"half-way house" between I and II. The Fed.used
borrowed reserves as its operating instrument, and
Table 1
Regression Results
OAt a o+ at UMt
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Regime I: 9/21/77to 10/3/79 (98 degrees offreedom)
Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate
Two- Year Treasury Rate. Five Years Forward
















Regime II: 10110/79to 10/3/82 (135 degrees offreedom)
Three-Month1reasury Bill Rate
Two- Year Treasury Rate. Five Years Forward
















Regime III: 10/10/82to 2/8/84 (52 degrees offreedom)
Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate
Two-YearTreasury Rate, Five Years Forward
















UM weekly pereentage change in MI minus the expected weekly percentage change (latter variable defined as the median
forecast ofthe survey ofmoney market economists conducted by Money Market Services, Inc.).
DA change in specified variable
where, the changes are calculated for Friday over Thursday in weeks prior to 1/30/80, and for Monday over Friday in
weeksending 1/30/80and after. When the day oforthe day following an MI announcement fell on a holiday, data for that
week were excluded from the sample.
Note: * significant at the 5-percent level
** significant at the I-percent level
statistics in parentheses.
41beyond sevenyears are not statistically significant,
indicating that a money surprise today has no sys-
tematic effectoninflationexpectations beyond sev-
en years. The point is illustrated by the result pre-
sentedinTable 1, that the lO-year rate, twenty years
forward, has acoefficientofonly 2basis points with
at-statistic ofonly 0.21. (Other results not present-
ed show that the three-year rate, seven years for-
ward,a.lso was not significantly influenced by MI-
surprises).
expected, the results for Regime III show a
smaller response for the real component (as reflec-
ted)nthe 3-month T-bill rate) and a larger response
in inflation expectations (as reflected in the forward
rates).
Specifically, a one-percent positive MI-surprise
causes the three-month T-bill rate to rise by 16 basis
points (less than in Regime II) and the two-year
rate, five years forward, to rise by 12Vl percent
(more than in Regime II). As with Regime 11, there
is no significant response of the ten-year rate,
twenty years forward.
However, the real puzzle occurs in Regime I, the
federal funds rate period. The apparent perception
by the market that the Fed reacted cautiously to
MI-surprises did not translate into changes in infla-
tion expectations when MI came in over or under
expectations. In that period, a one-percent MI-sur-
prise caused a small, but statistically significant,
6-basis-point increase in the Treasury bill rate, and
no statistically significant change in the two for-
ward rates reported.
permitted more short-run variability in interestrates
than in Regime I, but less than in II. 8
Thus, purely on the basis ofconsidering monetary
policy regimes, we would expect to find the largest
increases inshort-term rates in response to positive
Ml-surprisestooccurinRegime II, the next largest
in Regime III and the smallest in Regime I. The size
of these hypothesized responses reflects the hypo-
thesized market perception ofthe Fed's commit-
menno controlling money in the short-run, that is,
the greatest perceived commitment is demonstrated
by the greatest willingness to permit short-term
interest rates to move in response to a money
"blip." Moreover, we might expect that forward
rates would respond most strongly in the funds rate
Regime I, less strongly in Regime III and the least
strongly in Regime II.
The empirical results are presented in Table 1.
These results seem to resolve some, but not all, of
the money supply announcement puzzle. The re-
sults for Regimes II and III seem to make sense in
terms ofthe theoretical expectations discussed ear-
lier. In the nonborrowed reserves Regime II, a one
percent positive Ml-surprise caused a substantial
36-basis-point increase in MI on the following day.
Moreover, this response is highly statistically signi-
ficant (the t-statistic is 6.38).
This large response in the real rate contrasts with
the far smaller increase in expected inflation, as
measured by the 7Vl basis point increase in the
two-year rate, five years forward. Although this
response is fairly small, it is statistically significant
(the t-statistic is 2.08). Forward rates extending
III. Large Structural Deficits and
the Effects of Money Supply Announcements
The preceding analysis of the impact of MI-an-
nouncements on asset prices separated the sample
period at October 1979 and October 1982 on the
theory that the Federal Reserve has a significant
influence on those prices. With different operating
procedures, the market presumably anticipates dif-
ferent Fed behavior and asset prices respond dif-
ferently. This is quite a reasonable presumption.
However, the Fed's change in operating procedures
was not the only major policy change affecting the
data in the 1980s. There also was a major change in
fiscal policy, as reflected in the emergence oflarge
sustained federal deficits. Expectations of future
42
large structural deficits were well-formed at least as
early as President Reagan's tax cuts in July 1981.
How could the presence of large structural defi-
cits affect the response of asset prices to money
supply announcements? They could affect the re-
sponse of asset prices if the public believes the
Federal Reserve may monetize part of the federal
debt that is generated by budget deficits. Some
evidence of past monetization is in the economics
literature, although it is by no means conclusive,
and expectations concerning monetization are fre-
quently voiced in the financial press. 9 Forexample,
Hoey and Hotchkiss (1983) report results ofa sur-vey of financial decision-makers in December
1983, whichfound thatoutofover600 respondents,
about two-thirds agreed with the following state-
ment "One can have no confidence in the staying
powerofdisinflationary monetary policy aslong as
federal deficits remain in triple digits."
Monetization ofthe debt obviously would result
in higher inflation rates in the long-run, and thus
higher long-term interest rates. Once it becomes
clear that deficits are and will remain large, bond
rates should rise ifthe public believes the monetiza-
tion hypothesis. What role do MI-announcements
play? Although the public might believe the moneti-
zation hypothesis as ageneral principle, it presum-
ably would be uncertain about how much of the
federal debt might be monetized. Such uncertainty
would be consistent with the apparently changing
relationship between deficits and MI growth in the
past. Moreover, changes in the make-up of the
FederalOpen MarketCommittee, and in the general
political "climate" may be expected to influence
the degree ofmonetization.
As the weekly stock of MI is announced, the
public may refine its views about the degree of
monetization, and therefore about future money
growth and inflation. Thus, if MI comes in higher
(lower) than expected, the market may revise up
(down) its estimate of the degree of monetization,
and as a consequence, long-term rates will rise
(fall). The effects on long-term rates would not be
observed in a period oflow budget deficits because
there would not be much pressure for monetization
in such a period. With respect to short-term rates, a
positive MI-surprise might elicit smaller responses
when deficits are large because the marketexpects a
less aggressive offsetting action by the Fed.
As pointedoutby Hardonvelis, 1982, large struc-
tural deficits may help to make more senseoutofthe
combined inflationexpectations/policy anticipation
explanation ofasset price movements. In the 1980-
1982 period, a positive MI-surprise may have
caused short-term rates to rise because ofanticipa-
tions ofa partially offsetting action by the Fed
under the reserve control procedures. The same
positive MI-surprise may havecausedforward rates
to rise because the public revised up its estimate of
how much ofthe governmentdebt would bemone-
tized, and thus its view ofinflation in thelong-run.
In the pre-1980 period, short rates may have
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responded only slightly because no immediate
Fed policy reaction was anticipated, and forward
rates may have responded only slightly because
deficits were small and there was little pressure for
monetization.
A Test ofthe Monetization Hypothesis
Simply stated, the monetization hypothesis is
that a positive (negative) MI-surprise will elicit a
smallerincrease (decrease) in short-term rates and a
larger increase (decrease) in forward rates when
deficits are "large" than when they are small. This
hypothesis can be tested using data from monetary
policy Regime II. If we assume that the dividing
line between "small" and "large" expected future
deficits was designed by the Reagan tax cuts ofJuly
1981, then we can test the monetization hypothesis
by using data from monetary policy Regime II-
October 1979 to October 1982. Specifically, we can
see whether the estimated responses of spot and
forward interest rate and exchange rates changed as
predicted in mid-198I. To do so, we estimate the
same model as in Table lover the period October
10, 1979 to October 3, 1982, with two additional
arguments: (I) a dummy variable (D), that is zero
prior to July 6, 1981 and llnity thereafter; and (2)
the MI-surprise variable (UM) multiplied by the
same dummy variable (D). The first of these two
additional arguments permits·the intercept teill1 to
shift, while the second additional argument permits
the estimated response of interest rates to MI-sur-
prises to shift. The t-statistics on these coefficients
will indicate whether the estimated shifts are statis-
tically significant.
The regression results are presented in Table 2.
The results for the short-term spot interest rate are
consistent with the..monetization hypothesis. Prior
to the Reagan tax cut in mid-1981, a one-percent
Ml-surprise induced a 44-basis-point increase in
thethree-monthTreasury bill rate. After the tax cut,
this policy anticipations effect is estimated to be
much smaller-the effect falls by 22 basis points.
The same basic result is obtained for the one-year
rate, one-year forward: before the tax cut the re-
sponse was 32 basis points, and after the tax cut it
fell by a statistically significant 22 basis points.
The results for the more distant forward rates,
however, seem to be inconsistent with the moneti-
zation hypothesis. If,in the presence oflarge defi-DA
Table 2
Regression Results
OAt = a o+ a l UMt+ f300t +f310t UMt
f30 f31
Sample Period: 10/10179to10/3182 (135 degrees offreedom)
Three-Month 0.06 -0.05 44.21 ** -22.45* 0.24
Treasury Bill Rate (1.55) (0.86) (6.38) (1.87)
One-Year Treasury -0.003 0.()O4 32.43** -21.69** 0.28
Rate, One-Year Forward (0.13) (0.009) (7.25) (2.82)
Two-YearTreasury 0.017 0.034 9.05** -5.03 0.02
Rate. Five Years Forward (0.65) (0.87) (2.03) (0.66)
Ten-YearTreasury 0.004 0.07 10.90 -9.36 0.01
Rate, Twenty Years Forward (0.06) (064) (0.94) (099)
D, = 0 in 10/10/79 to 6/30/81, and I in 7/6/81 to 10/3/82.
Note: Variables are defined in note to Table I.
* significant at the 5-percent level (one-tailed test)
** significant at the I-percent level (one-tailed test)
cits, the public interprets a positive Ml-surprise as
raising the odds that the Fed is monetizing part of
the deficit, then it simultaneously should raise its
expectations of future inflation. For this reason,
coefficient f3 I in Table 2 for the two-year rate, five
years forward (and possibly for the ten-year rate,
twenty years forward) should be significantly posi-
tive. Instead, it is insignificantly negative-that is,
there was no statistically significant shift in the
responses of this variable corresponding to the tax
cut in mid-I98l.
Onthe basis ofthe evidence presented, it does not
appear that the presence of large structural deficits
resolves the inconsistencies that appear to exist in
the responses of forward interest rates to Ml-sur-
prises. The main mystery that still exists is the
following: if a positive Ml-surprise after the Fed
beganexercising better long-run control over Ml in
October 1979 caused an increase in inflation expec-
tations, why did it not also do so prior to that date,
when the Fed's control procedures seemed less well
designed to control inflation? The monetization hy-
pothesis holds that some ofthis inconsistency could
be resolved by the presence oflarge deficits and the
fear that they might be monetized after mid-1981,
and the lack of large deficits in the earlier period.
However, there does not appear to have been a
change in the response of inflation expectations to
Ml-surprises between the two periods.
1\1. Conclusion
This paperhas examinedthe responses ofinterest
rates to announcements of changes in M1 that are
not anticipated by the market. The findings can be
summarized as follows. Short-term spot rates of
interest increase in response to a positive MI-sur-
prise, and like earlier studies, we found that the
responses became much larger when the Federal
Reserve used a nonborrowed reserves-oriented op-
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erating procedure in October 1979 to October 1982
than in the earlier Federal funds rate regime. The
Fed's current operating procedure, which is ori-
entedaround borrowed reserves, seems to be inter-
preted by the market as a kind of"half-wayhouse"
betweenthe previous two regimes. The responses of
short-termspot rates are largerthan in the funds rate
regime, but smaller than in the nonborrowed re-serves regime. These positive responses of short-
t$rmrates,together with their relative sizesin the
various monetary policy regimes, strongly suggest
that the reSponses represent a policy anticipations
effect. That is, when Mtcomes inoverexpecta-
tions, the marketexpectstheFedtotightenpolicy to
some extent, depending on the policyregime.
The interpretation ofthe responsesof long-term
rates is not as straightforward. Earlier studies have
found a highly significant, .and surprisingly large,
positive·response of long-term interest rates, even
out to maturities ofthirty years, in response to MI
sUrprises in the post-October 1979 period, but little
effect before. These responses sometimes have
been interpreted as demonstrating changes in infla-
tion expectations. It is difficult to imagine why a
single weekly M1 figure would have a substantial
impact on long-run inflation expectations. To cast
more light on this issue, we examined the responses
offorward rates ofinterest far in the future. It does
appear that inflation expectations were affected by
MI-surprises after October 1979, but these effects
seem to extendoutonly about seven years, andto be
of a fairly reasonable size. Thus, the responses of
30-yearbonds does not suggest that expected infla-
tion thirty years hence has changed. Instead, the
responses reflect changes in realinterest rates cur-
rently and in the near future, and inflation expecta-
tions outto about seven years.
This combination ofresponses is consistent with
the view that the market believes the Fed has at-
tempted to control Ml somewhat cautiously. A pos-
itive Ml-surprise apparently causes the market to
expect some tightening action by the Fed, but not
enough tightening action to prevent a moderate in-
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crease in inflation. This interpretation is confirmed
by the result that when the Fed switched from a
nonborrowed reserves- to a borrowed reserVes-ori-
ented operating procedure, the policy anticipation
effectbecamesmalleraridthe inflationexpectations
effect larger. The market's apparent perceptionthat
there would be aless aggressivetighteningofpolicy
when MI increased unexpectedlytherefore corres-
ponded to the anticipation that infl:j.tion wouldin.-
crease by more than itwould have in the earlier
policy regime.
The remaining puzzle about Ml-announcement
effects is that there appears to have been no re-
sponse in inflation expectations prior to October
1979, when the Fed used a funds rate operating
procedure. Since that procedure involved.only·a
very small policy anticipations effect, one might
expect a large inflation expectation effect, especi-
ally compared with the period after October 1979
when the Fed explicitly pursued an anti-inflation
policy.
This paper hypothesized that the lack ofa strong
inflation expectation effect may be related to the
change in fiscal policy regimes in mid-1981, when
expected future structural budget deficits clearly
became "large." It is possible that the public fears
monetization ofthe government debt when deficits
are large, and that a positive MI-surprise tends to
add to this fear. Conversely, the lack oflarge defi-
cits in the funds rate regime might help explain the
lack of an inflation expectation effect. The results
for short-term spot rates seem to confirm this hypo-
thesis, but those for expected future interest rates do
not. Further research will be required to solve the
money supply announcement puzzle completely.FOOTNOTES
1. SeeCornell, 1983, fora review ofthis literature.
2. See DeRosaand Stern, 1977.
3. SeeJudd, 1982.
4. Cornell, 1983, discusses two other theories. The real
activity hypothesis argues that the demand for money is a
function ofexpectedfutureincome, andthatan M1-surprise
causes an upward revision in estimates of expected future
income. As a consequence, interest rates rise when M1
rises more than expected. Cornell also discusses the risk
aversion hypothesis, which argues that an unanticipated




7. For example, the ten-year rate, twenty-years forward is
calculated as a duration weighted averageofthe difference
between the thirty-year spot rate and the twenty-year spot
rate. The linearapproximation enters the formula for calcu-
lating duration. This method also is employed in Loeys,
1984, which came to the present author's attention as this
paperwas goingtothe printer.
8. See Wallich, 1984.
9. See Hamburgerand Zwick, 1981, McMillian and Beard,
1982, and Niskanen, 1978.
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